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RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AS
SELF-TRANSCENDENCE AND SELF-DECEPTION
Merold Westphal

Religious experience can be defined as self-transcendence. Models of this
decentering of the self are not found in the transcendence of intentionality or
in either contemplative or ecstatic self-forgetfulness, since all these leave the
self as center. While they play important roles in authentic religion, experience that does not get beyond them is self-deceived and ultimately idolatrous.
Only in the ethical claim that places limits on my will to be the center do I
encounter the truly other. Even here the form of true religion may assist
self-deception about the presence of its substance.

Perhaps you've heard those lemonade ads that refer to the good old days
when we listened to baseball games on the radio. That part reminds me of
my own conversion-to lifetime membership in the Diehard Cubs Fan Club.
Every summer afternoon, as I sat in front of my grandmother's floor model
radio, Bert Wilson would preach the good news, "We don't care who wins,
as long as it's the Cubs." And in spite of the fact that in good years they only
managed to beat out the Pirates for seventh place, I became a true believer.
But when the lemonade ad suggests that it's "sorta cheatin'" to watch baseball
on television, I am reminded of something quite different. It was my sophomore year in college and one of the most gifted students I have ever known,
whose specialty was the oral interpretation of literature, was giving his senior
speech recital. Like an ancient Greek rhapsode, and all in a little under an
hour, he gave us Doctor Zhivago. For all its visual splendor, like televised
baseball, the movie version that I was to see later did not surpass this oldfashioned oral version in dramatic power. The concluding line, taken from
one of Pasternak's poems, was utterly shattering and unforgettable. "To live
life to the end is no childish task."
Kierkegaard expresses this same conviction that life is the task of a lifetime
by satirizing those for whom most of life is supposed to consist in living
happily ever after. For such, "when they have arrived at a certain point in
their search for truth, life takes on a change. They marry, and they acquire a
certain position, in consequence of which they feel that they must in all honor
have something finished, that they must have result. .. And so they come to
think of themselves as really finished ... Living in this manner, one is relieved
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of the necessity of becoming executively aware of the strenuous difficulties
which the simplest of propositions about existing qua human-being involves"
(1941: 78-79; cf. 1980: 55-56).
By arguing that such persons are strangers to religion, no matter how
orthodox or pious, Kierkegaard suggests that this enduring adult task has
religious import. But what is this task, which is the sine qua non of religion,
and from which, apparently, only death can release us? The Augustinian
tradition, to which Kierkegaard belongs, is united in its answer: self-transcendence. This is why Augustine speaks of the incarnation as the means by which
Jesus "might detach from themselves those who were to be subdued and bring
them over to Himself, healing the swelling of their pride and fostering their
love so that instead of going further in their own self-confidence, they should
put on weakness ... should cast themselves down upon that divinity which,
rising would bear them up aloft" (1963: 155). From this perspective follows
the Augustinian beatitude: "Blessed is the man who loves you, who loves his
friend in you, and his enemy because of you" (79).
Thomas Merton gives the same answer when he writes, "We do not detach
ourselves from things in order to attach ourselves to God, but rather we
become detached/rom ourselves in order to see and use all things in and for
God" (1972: 21).
Gabriel Marcel puts the point on the horizontal plane in describing the
nature and difficulty of admiration, "whose enormous spiritual and even
metaphysical significance is still not recognized. The verb lift forcefully and
accurately denotes the kind of effect admiration evokes in us, or rather realizes in us as a function of the object which evokes it. .. It is clear that the
function of admiration is to tear us away from ourselves and from the thoughts
we have of ourselves ... Not so long ago a dramatist affirmed during an interview that admiration was for him a humiliating state which he resisted with
all his force ... An analysis similar to the one Scheler has given of resentment
should disclose that there is a burning preoccupation with self at the bottom
of this suspicion [of anything superior], a 'but what about me, what becomes
of me in that case?' ... To affirm: admiration is a humiliating state, is the same
as to treat the subject as a power existing for itself and taking itself as a
center. To proclaim on the other hand, that it is an exalted state is to start
from the inverse notion that the proper function of the subject is to emerge
from itself and realize itself primarily in the gift of oneself' (1964: 47-49).
Finally, as if to exhibit the agreement between Protestant and Catholic
Augustinians on this point, we can return to Kierkegaard himself. His definitions of the self and of faith spell out his understanding of self-transcendence as the lifelong task of life. The self is "a relation that relates itself to
itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another" (1980: 13-14).
This latter relation is faith when "in relating itself to itself and in willing to
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be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it" (49; cf.
14,30,82, 131).
Augustine and Merton introduce the basic notion of becoming detached
from ourselves. Marcel makes it clear that this involves the transition from
a self preoccupied with itself and its position as the center to a self capable
of giving itself in admiration and creative fidelity to another. From the point
of view of the point of departure, this is a humiliating tearing away from that
to which I cling with all my might. From the point of view of the destination,
this is a liberating elevation above the narrow horizons defined by the question, But what about me? In short, self-transcendence is the journey from the
false self to the true self, with all of its agony and its ecstasy.
In spite of its austere from, Kierkegaard's formula for faith recapitulates
these themes and introduces another. First, with Augustine and Merton he is
explicit that we are to be detached from ourselves in order to be attached to
God. 'Freedom from' is in the service of 'freedom for.' Here we encounter
the wonderful ambiguity of the term 'transcendence.' It can mean that which
is beyond, the transcendent. Or it can mean going beyond, transcending. For
the Augustinian tradition the two are united, and transcending is toward the
transcendent. What is beyond my false self is not simply my true self, but
the not-myself in proper relation to which it first becomes possible for me to
be my true self. Only by losing myself, in the sense of going beyond myself
toward the not-myself, do I ever truly find myself.
Second, with Marcel, Kierkegaard is explicit that the relation to the other
is a humble, decentering relation. (This is why it is experienced by pride as
humiliation.) Self-transcendence means willing to be myself while at the
same time willing to let God be God, that is, willing to be myself without
insisting on being God. It is the exact opposite of Nietzsche's Zarathustra,
who says, "if there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Hence
there are no gods" (1966b: 86, "Upon the Blessed Isles"). It means learning
to pray
Hallowed by Thy name

Thy kingdom come
Thy will be done

without surreptitiously co-opting the name and the kingdom so that my will
may be done on earth and in heaven.
Finally, for all of its emphasis on the role of the transcendent in self-transcendence, Kierkegaard's account explicitly links relation-to-an-other to selfrelation. Only as self-relating selfhood does the self transcend itself toward
its true self in relation to the transcendent. Given the historical linkage of the
Augustinian dubito to the Cartesian cogito, this introduction of inwardness
should not take us by surprise. Among its most important implications is that
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the metaphor of organic development can never be more than a metaphor,
and a rather poor one at that, for self-transcendence. The latter presupposes
too much in the way of self-awareness and self-involvement (Evans, 1963).
On the other hand, by making self-presence itself a task rather than an
achievement, Kierkegaard excludes that total self-presence by virtue of which
the self could claim to be the center. This expresses the great gulf fixed
between his Augustinianism and its modern, secular counterpart, the Cartesian-Humean (Husserlian-positivist) tradition. In its self-relation the self is
not posited as the ground of certainty, the criterion of truth, the self-sufficient
and absolute mode of being, in short, the center. If I may be permitted to
express the point oxymoronically, to counter Cartesian modernity's arrogant
Augustinianism, Kierkegaard develops the inwardness of a decentered Cartesianism. The I of the Augustinian "I think" is always a problem, never a
possession nor an Archimedean pou sto.
Having given this somewhat extended Augustinian definition of self-transcendence, I now want to suggest that we use it as at least a working definition
of religious experience. Religious experience =df self-transcendence, the selfaware, self-involving, self-transforming relation to the ultimately transcendent. While I believe this definition has advantages at the descriptive level
for the phenomenological and historical study of religion, the present essay
will focus on its prescriptive employment as a norm for distinguishing authentically religious experience from its look alikes. Not all the beliefs, practices, and feelings that are easily recognized as religious are acts of
self-transcendence. Prayer, for example, can easily be "a burning preoccupation with self," a solemn repetition of the question, "But what about me, what
becomes of me in that case?"
AIterity is a big topic among philosophers these days, and a number of
contemporary conversations have reminded us how difficult it is for the
human spirit to be "at home [bei sich] with itself in its otherness as such"
(Hegel, 1949: 790, my italics; cf. Taylor, 1987). This formula of Hegel's is
strikingly similar to Kierkegaard's designation of faith as a self-relating that
is simultaneously an other-relating. Its "as such" is meant as a reminder that
the other is meant to remain other. But for all his emphasis on dialectic as
the path of otherness, opposition, negation, contradiction, and so forth, Hegel
himself stands accused of taking away with dialectical reconciliation what
he first gives in the form of dialectical difference. Dialectic turns out to be
a monological self-mediation rather than a dialogical other-mediation
(Habermas, 1987 and Desmond, 1987).
In a similar vein, Derridean deconstruction, flying significantly under the
banner of differance, is a sustained polemic against the metaphysics of presence precisely as the reduction of the different to the same. The debate with
Gadamer, for example, can perhaps best be summarized as the reciprocal
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claims, I am more open to otherness than you are (Michelfelder and Palmer,
1989; cf. Caputo, 1987).
These discussions provide an important context for any contemporary discussion of religious experience as self-transcendence. What is more, reflection on specifically religious experience can make an important contribution
to the wider discussion of otherness in general. For, in the first place, the
holy, the ultimately transcendent, has appropriately been designated, not
merely as other but as "wholly other." It is quintessentially transcendent.
Secondly, self-transcendence may be more than casually linked to the transcendent; it may well be the condition and measure of the transcendent. This
would mean, not that there is the transcendent only to the degree that we are
able to transcend ourselves, but that we experience the transcendent as such,
as truly other, only to the degree that we are able to transcend ourselves.
Conversely, to the degree that self-transcendence fails, transcendence is only
apparent, that is, idolatrous.
In order to explore this hypothesis and to clarify the normative significance
of the concept of religious experience as self-transcendence, I want to look
at a variety of other modes of experience in order to highlight the tenuousness
of transcendence in them. The claim that knowledge is self-transcendence is
an good point of departure both because religion is so often identified with
religious beliefs and because philosophers so often speak of knowledge as
transcendence. For example, Fichte says that "the I forgets itself in the object
of its activity ... Intuition is the name of this action, a silent, unconscious
contemplation, which loses itself in its object" (Breazeale, 1988: 260).
Kojeve expands on this idea. "Now, the analysis of 'thought,' 'reason,' 'understanding,' and so on-in general, of the cognitive, contemplative, passive
behavior of a being or a 'knowing subject' -never reveals the why or the
how of the birth of the word T '" The man who contemplates is 'absorbed'
by what he contemplates; the 'knowing subject' 'loses' himself in the object
that is known. Contemplation reveals the object, not the sUbject. .. The man
who is 'absorbed' by the object that he is contemplating can be 'brought back
to himself' only by a Desire" (1969: 3). In other words, in desire we are
related to the other, for example, something we want to eat, only as the mode
in which we are preoccupied with ourselves and satisfying our needs; but in
cognition real transcendence occurs as we lose ourselves and become absorbed in the object.
Since Husserl treats intentionality primarily as cognitive, his claim that
intentionality is transcendence can help us make this claim more precise. In
the first place there is the transcendence of the physical object to perception.
It is transcendent by virtue of exceeding whatever it is able to give of itself
"in person," whatever is directly present to perception. It can present its front
side, but not its other sides. It can only present itself in adumbrations

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

173

(abschattungen) which it always infinitely exceeds (1983: par. 41-42). In this
way the object transcends the perception of it.
Other objects, such as mental processes (Erlebnisse) are not given in this
way. "Ein Erlebnis shattet sich nicht ab." For this reason there is a sharp
distinction to be drawn between a mental process and a physical thing (Ding),
namely that the former "can be perceived in an immanental perception,"
while the latter is always transcendent (par. 42).
There are also nonspatial objects that have their own mode of transcendence. In reflection my intentional object is a cogitatio, one of my own, and
we might label this "internal perception." But Husserl prefers the language
of immanence and transcendence to that of internal and external. So he says
that "by intentive mental processes related to something immanent, we understand those to which it is essential that their intentional objects, if they
exist at all, belong to the same stream of mental processes to which they
themselves belong ... lntentive mental processes of which that is not the case
are directed to something transcendent" (par. 38, his italics). This means that
my cognition is transcendent whenever it is directed to an "object" that is not
a cogitatio or Erlebnis of my own. Among such objects are not only spatial
objects but essences, other egos, and their Erlebnisse.
This seems to be very close to the realism of G. E. Moore, grounded in the
distinction between the act and the object of consciousness (1953: ch. XVI
and 1959: ch. I-II). Given the way in which both Moore and Husserl distinguish the intentional object (noema) from the act that intends it (noesis), it
is not clear why we shouldn't say that every intentional act involves transcendence. Whether or not that is what they intend us to conclude, we can
distinguish three theses about intentionality and transcendence:
1)

We encounter transcendence in every intentional object (since the act
and the object can always be distinguished).

2)

We encounter transcendence in those intentional objects which are not
themselves our own cogitationes or Erlebnisse (since they do not belong
to the stream of mental acts that includes the acts that intend them).

3)

We encounter transcendence in those intentional objects that are physical, i.e., spatial (since they can only give themselves partially, perspectivally, abschattungsweise).

No doubt each of these theses embodies a legitimate and useful concept of
transcendence. But none of them gives us the self-transcendence we are
looking for, that detachment from self that moves us beyond preoccupation
with what Kant calls "the dear self."
The first reason for this is clear if we return briefly to Kojeve. The separation of cognition from desire that he attributes to the knowing subject is by
no means typical of cognition. Hume, the father of positivism, says, "Reason
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is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to
any other office than to serve and obey them" (1888: 415). Nietzsche, the
father of postmodernism, agrees: "but reason is merely an instrument, and
Descartes is superficial" (1966a: 104). If we think of positivism and
postmodernism as diseases to be eliminated like polio and smallpox, the best
we can hope to do is show that Hume and Nietzsche are not right all of the
time. We would surely be kidding ourselves to deny that they are right at
least most of the time. And whether instrumental reason is to be seen as the
glory or the curse of modernity, it is nothing if not preoccupation with the
self (personal and collective) and its desires.
But, it may well be objected, did not Fichte and Kojeve speak explicitly
about contemplation, making it clear they have disinterested cognition in
mind? The Greeks and their modem followers often speak of philosophy as
theoria in this sense, but at least since the eighteenth century the notion of
disinterested contemplation has primarily been developed in relation to aesthetic experience. A tradition that extends from Shaftesbury, Hutcheson,
Burke, and Alison through Kant and Schopenhauer to Croce and Edward
Bullough has sought to make the transcendence of self-interest the key to
aesthetic appreciation (see Westphal, 1984: 131-35). The anti-instrumental,
anti-utilitarian theme of this tradition is succinctly expressed by C. S. Lewis,
"the many use art and the few receive it" (1961: 19), and by Oscar Wilde,
"All art is quite useless" (1981: xxiv).
The examples Shaftesbury gives of disinterested contemplation make it
clear that breaking the link between intentionality and desire is the heart of
the matter. It is the absence of the desire to command, the desire to own, the
desire to eat, and the desire to touch sexually that makes the perception of
beauty disinterested, and Shaftesbury understandably speaks of this as the
transcendence of "selfishness," "self-interest," and "self-love" (1964: II, 12628, I, 78, 274-75, 317).
There can be little doubt that in theoretical and aesthetic contemplation we
have the self-forgetfulness Fichte and Kojeve have in mind, in which the
subject sinks from sight, playing at most the role of background or horizon
while the object becomes foreground and theme. If we remember that
Shaftesbury's primary interest in disinterestedness was not aesthetics but
ethics and religion, we may think that we have found what we are looking
for (cf. O'Connor, 1972: 151-52). But this model is also too weak.
Contemplative self-forgetfulness takes us beyond instrumental reason, to
be sure. Hume and Nietzsche might deny that it ever exists, and we would
do well to take their suspicions seriously. But let us retain the hypothesis that
it sometimes does occur, at least to a significant degree. The problem begins
with Aristotle, whose Metaphysics begins with the words, "All men by nature
desire to know." It looks as if the link between knowledge and desire has not
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been cut after all. Of course, the desire to know is not a selfish desire, as if
knowledge were a zero sum game. But it is, even when it has no instrumental
significance, the desire to satisfy and fulfill the self. To use a Rawlsian
distinction (1971: 127-29), it is a desire both of the self (my desire) and in
the self (for my satisfaction). For this reason, Aristotle's ethics, including his
theory of contemplation as an intellectual virtue, is properly identified as a
self-realization theory.
Shaftesbury points us in the same direction. "For though the habit of selfishness and the multiplicity of interested views are of little improvement to
real merit or virtue, yet there is a necessity for the preservation of virtue, that
it should be thought to have no quarrel with true interest and self-enjoyment"
(1964: 274). The point is not that self-realization and self-enjoyment are evil.
It is simply that contemplative experience, theoretical or aesthetic, that is
properly interpreted in these terms can hardly be a convincing model for
religious experience conceived as detachment from self. Disinterestedness
may delimit but it does not displace the supremacy of the self, which remains
the horizon for contemplative self-forgetfulness. Conversely, if religious experience is to be conceived as self-transcendence, any piety that does not get
beyond both instrumental self-seeking and contemplative self-enjoyment is
not genuine religious experience.
C. S. Lewis fails to see this point in an otherwise illuminating discussion
of heaven in The Problem of Pain. People are nervous about "pie in the sky"
escapism, he notes. But if there is no "pie in the sky" then Christianity is
false, and if there is, then we must deal with it. He writes, "we are afraid that
heaven is a bribe, and that if we make it our goal we shall no longer be
disinterested. It is not so. Heaven offers nothing that a mercenary soul can
desire. It is safe to tell the pure in heart that they shall see God, for only the
pure in heart want to." With the right kind of glosses on these claims Lewis
could take us beyond disinterestedness to genuine transcendence. But instead
of doing so he remains within the dichotomy of disinterested and mercenary.
"There are rewards that do not sully motives. A man's love for a woman is
not mercenary because he wants to marry her, nor his love for poetry mercenary because he wants to read it, nor his love of exercise less disinterested
because he wants to run and leap and walk. Love, by definition, seeks to
enjoy its object" (1962: 144-45). By being satisfied as long as enjoyment is
not mercenary, Lewis, like Shaftesbury, fails to notice the limitations of
enjoyment with reference to transcendence.
The mercenary is one who does what is not enjoyable for the sake of what
is. Mercenary behavior is instrumental, means-end behavior. Mercenary love
is false love, as when a man loves a woman for her money or a woman loves
a man for the security he provides. Disinterested behavior does not have this
means-end structure, and disinterested love does not arise from ulterior mo-
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tives. When the Psalmist prays, "For God alone my soul in silence waits"
(62.1), this can be a mercenary prayer meaning, "Only God can get me out
of this mess," or it can be a disinterested prayer meaning, "Not even the
benefits of divine grace, but only God in person can satisfy me." There is a
huge difference between these two prayers, but in both cases the self is
concerned with its own satisfaction, and the love that seeks to enjoy its object
is caught up in its own enjoyment.
It is Levinas who sees more clearly than anyone that the other enjoyed is
not necessarily transcendent, and, consequently, that enjoyment is not necessarily self-transcendence. Echoing the Hegelian formula we noted earlier,
Levinas finds us not content merely to be at home with ourselves in familiar
surroundings (his chez soi = Hegel's bei sich) but disposed to reach out
"toward an alien outside-of-oneself, toward a yonder." He calls this desire for
genuine otherness metaphysical desire. But the other thus desired "is not 'other'
like the bread I eat, the land in which I dwell, the landscape I contemplate .. .1
can 'feed' on these realities and to a very great extent satisfy myself, as though
I had simply been lacking them. Their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my own
identity as a thinker or a possessor. The metaphysical desire tends toward something else entirely, toward the absolutely other" (1969: 33).
As this passage indicates, eating is the paradigm of enjoyment and the
source of the appearance of transcendence therein. Against all forms of idealism, which interpret knowledge as the primacy of subject over object, the
reduction of the latter's otherness to the sameness of the former, alimentation
reminds me that I am a body within the world and not just a mind for whom
the world is a spectacle. Food overflows its meaning as an object of representation and becomes a condition for the very acts by which such meaning
is constituted (127-30). In my dependence on the elements of life I seem to
encounter something quite other than myself.
Levinas makes three points about enjoyment so construed that are relevant
to our project. First, as Shaftesbury and Lewis have noted, in enjoyment we
are beyond self-interest conceived in instrumental or mercenary terms. "Here
lies the permanent truth of hedonist moralities: to not seek, behind the satisfaction of need, an order relative to which alone satisfaction would require
a value; to take satisfaction, which is the very meaning of pleasure, as a term.
The need for food does not have existence as its goal, but food. Biology
teaches the prolongation of nourishment into existence; need is naive" (134).
Second, enjoyment is pure egoism, not self-transcendence. "In enjoyment
I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to the Other, I am alone
without solitude, innocently egoist and alone. Not against the Others, not 'as
for me ... ' -but entirely deaf to the Other, outside of all communication and
all refusal to communicate-without ears, like a hungry stomach" (134; his
ellipsis). I may be dependent on the elements from which I draw my nour-
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ishment, but "in the satisfaction of need the alienness of the world that founds
me loses its alterity ... Through labor and possession the alterity of nutriments
enters into the same" (129).
Finally, as the phrase 'like a hungry stomach' suggests, eating is but a
model of many different modes of enjoyment. As "an ultimate relation with
the substantial plenitude of being," enjoyment "embraces all relations with
things" (133). I take this to mean not that there is nothing but enjoyment, but
that there is no relation that cannot be elevated to/reduced to enjoyment. In
spite of the initial distinction between knowledge and enjoyment, Levinas is
explicit that cognitive relations can have this structure, especially when they
have a contemplative character. Thus, "I but open my eyes and already enjoy
the spectacle" (130). And we have already seen him assimilate "the landscape
I contemplate" to "the bread I eat." The psalmist who thirsts for the face of
God as a deer for streams of water (42: 1-2) has surely made spiritual progress
over those whose only appetites are for "wine, women, and song." But the
journey toward genuine religious experience may not be over.
There is stilI another mode of self-forgetfulness that turns out to be something less than the self-transcendence we are seeking to clarify. Like contemplation it takes us beyond the mercenary, and it often turns up in religious
contexts. We can call it ecstatic self-forgetfulness, as distinct from contemplative. The two are not totally different, for there surely is a contemplative
ecstasy, for example, in Yoga.
We can consider play, as interpreted by Gadamer, as something of a transition experience. Since he relates play to the religious festival and claims
that "The player experiences the game as a reality that surpasses him" (110,
97-98), there is obvious reference to our own question about religious experience. Even the spectator is able "to forget one's own purposes ... To be
present...has a character of being outside oneself." This "ecstasy of being
outside oneself [Ekstatik des Aussersichseins]" is "the positive possibility of
being wholly with something else. This kind of being present is a self-forgetfulness, and it is the nature of the spectator to give himself in self-forgetfulness to what he is watching" (110-11; cf. 113-14).
More sharply distinct from contemplative self-forgetfulness than Gadamerian play is the Dionysian, as described by Nietzsche. It is not only a self-forgetfulness by contrast with Apollinian self-knowledge; it also dwells among
the "wilder emotions" from which Apollinian calm is free (1967: 45,35). Far
from being any kind of spectator sport, it is a realm of Rausch (intoxication,
delirium, frenzy, transport, ecstasy, rapture) and Verziickung (ecstasy, rapture,
transport, trance, convulsion). In the "dancers of St. John and st. Vitus," in
"the Bacchic choruses of the Greeks," and "as far back as Babylon and the
orgiastic Sacaea," we find the Dionysian experience in which "everything
subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness" (33-37).
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There is clearly a dimension of self-transcendence here, even of detachment
from self. But ecstatic self-forgetfulness is no more what we are looking for
than was contemplative self-forgetfulness. Gadamer tells us as much himself
when he writes, "Thus to the ecstatic self-forgetfulness of the spectator there
corresponds his continuity with himself. Precisely that in which he loses
himself as a spectator requires his own continuity ... the absolute moment in
which a spectator stands is at once self-forgetfulness and reconciliation with
self. That which detaches him from everything also gives him back the whole
of his being" (1975: 113-14).
This sounds so much like the words of Jesus (Mark 8: 35) that we might
easily think we have found the definition of religious self-transcendence if
Gadamer had not also said, in the middle of the passage just quoted, "It is
the truth of [the spectator's] o~n world, the religious and moral world in
which he lives, which presents itself to him and in which he recognizes
himself." William James is said to have complained that for Josiah Royce
"the world is real but not so very damn real." We might say here that the
ecstatic self encounters something other than itself, but no so very damn
other. In other words, though the elements on which the self feeds here are
spiritual rather than physical, we have not gotten beyond the realm of nutrition. Like its contemplative counterpart, ecstatic self-forgetfulness is a species of enjoyment.
That this is also true for Nietzsche's wilder version is perhaps clearest in
his linkage of the Dionysian with sexual ecstasy (1967: 36; 1968: sec. 798801). I do not mean simply that sex is fun. What I have in mind is best
expressed in the comment one of my students made to me years ago. After
living together for a while, she and her boyfriend had broken up and separated. Though she had no apparent scruples about having lived together, she
was obviously not comfortable about the fact that they still secretly got
together to have sex. Her explanation/excuse: "the only time I can ever forget
myself is when I'm having sex." Her ex-boyfriend was "other but not so very
damn other" because he was but an element through which her need was
satisfied. That her need was primarily for oblivion rather than for pleasure
or intimacy does not take her experience, or Nietzsche's Dionysian of which
it is a model, beyond the framework of enjoyment. Self-forgetfulness continues to be a mode of being preoccupied with oneself, in this case with killing
for oneself the pain of being oneself.
Although we have not yet found the model that will clarify for us what is
essential about the peculiar combination of transcendence and self-transcendence which the Augustinian tradition offers as a normative concept of religious experience, the time has come to introduce our second major theme,
self-deception. For it will throw light on our negative results to this point.
Our point of departure can be the suspicion Nietzsche directs toward religious
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experience, even that of religious founders. "One sort of honesty has been
alien to all founders of religions and their kind: They have never made their
experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge. 'What did I really experience?' ... None of them has asked such questions, nor do any of our dear
religious people ask them even now" (1974: 253).
Paul Ricoeur translates this kind of question into the language of the biblical prophets on the warpath against idolatry as he introduces his own hermeneutics of suspicion. "In our time we have not finished doing away with
idols and we have barely begun to listen to symbols. It may be that this
situation, in its apparent distress, is instructive: it may be that extreme iconoclasm belongs to the restoration of meaning" (1970: 27). To listen to religious symbols is to open oneself to a claim from what purports to be
ultimately transcendent and to entertain the possibility of transcending oneself in that direction. To do away with idols is to take seriously the suspicion
that what purports to be listening to religious symbols is actually something
quite different, an acoustic illusion in which my own voice is mistaken for
the divine voice. When this occurs, religion becomes a disguised form of
self-centering or preoccupation with oneself. For corresponding to false-consciousness are false gods, and the deities who are the means or the elements
for self-centering are wish-fulfilling projections whose fictitious character
does not keep them from being rivals to whatever may be truly sacred (see
Westphal, 1987).
Ricoeur's suggestion is that the pursuit of any possibly genuine self-transcendence must include a negative, iconoclastic moment. He calls us to renew
the question that Jonathan Edwards put so sharply with reference to the "holy
affections" in which "true religion, in great part, consists" (1959: 95)-how
can we distinguish the truly holy affections from their counterfeit counterparts? Precisely our failure, to this point, to find an adequate model for the
self-transcendence that constitutes genuine religious experience puts us in a
good position to see why Nietzsche and Ricoeur and Edwards (like Amos and
Jesus) refuse to take everything that offers itself as religious experience at
face value. For that failure contains the transcendental deduction, so to speak,
of three idols.
To begin with, any religious experience that contents itself with what we
have called intentional transcendence can be shown to be idolatrous. Religion
that consists of nothing more than doctrinal knowledge of a transcendent
creator and savior, for example, no matter how correct and orthodox such
doctrine may be, reduces God to one of my clear and distinct ideas. Having
already reduced the wholly other to the proposition ally possessed, it will
complete itself as the instrumental religion in which the truth serves as a
security blanket or a weapon against one's opponents and thus as an escape
from the call to a decentered selfhood (see Westphal, 1980).

Faith and Philosophy

180

Similarly, insofar as religious experience can be adequately described in
terms of either contemplative or ecstatic self-forgetfulness, its gods will be
but vehicles of enjoyment, nutritional elements lacking the kind of transcendence in themselves that would make them wholly and genuinely other or
enable them to inspire any detachment from self.
To call the gods of such religions idols is to recognize them as convenient
fictions masked as transcendent realities. But the iconoclasm that labels them
as such should not be misunderstood to be the claim that there is no place in
true religion for doctrinal affirmation or for either contemplative or ecstatic
self-forgetfulness. On the contrary, I want to insist that there is an important
place for each of these in true religion. The point is that by themselves these
moments do not make up the true religion we seek. Something is missing,
something so essential that without it these important moments of true religion become the embodiment of false. What is it?
There is an important clue in Gadamer's analysis of contemplative and
ecstatic self-forgetfulness. Much as Lewis distinguishes the few who receive
art from the many who use it, Gadamer emphasizes the "important difference
between a spectator who gives himself entirely to the play of art, and someone
who merely gapes at something out of curiosity." For the former "the play of
art does not simply exhaust itself in the ecstatic emotion of the moment, but
has a claim to permanence and the permanence of a claim" (1975: 111-12).
We might take this talk about a claim in purely aesthetic terms, as if the
work of art lays claim to be recognized as a classic. But Gadamer seems to
have in mind something more nearly like the experience Rilke expresses in
his sonnet, "Archaic Torso of Apollo."
Never will we know his fabulous head
where the eyes' apples slowly ripened. Yet
his torso glows: a candelabrum set
before his gaze which is pushed back and hid,
restrained and shining. Else the curving breast
could not thus blind you nor through the soft tum
of the loins could this smile easily have passed
into the bright groins where the genitals burned.
Else stood this stone a fragment and defaced,
with lucent body from the shoulders falling,
too short, not gleaming like a lion's fell;
nor would this star have shaken the shackles off,
bursting with light, until there is no place
that does not see you. You must change your life.
(MacIntyre, 1957: 92-93)
We are not prepared for these last five words, 'You must change your life.'
Like the words, 'To live life to the end is no childish task' at the conclusion

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

181

of Doctor Zhivago, their claim upon us shatters the calm of contemplation
and calls us beyond the realm of aesthetic enjoyment to ethical, even religious
responsibility. For this reason Gadamer explicates his notion of the claim in
terms of Kierkegaard's challenge to contemporaneity with Christ and to hearing the proclamation of the gospel in a sermon, as understood by dialectical
theology (1975: 112-13). His earlier notion that "the player experiences the
game as a reality that surpasses him" (98), now becomes the notion that in
the claim we encounter the "truth" of the "moral and religious world" in
which we live (113).
There is an ambiguity here. As a moral and religious claim, this truth seems
to have the categorical character that would render it truly other. But, as Kant
and Freud insist with the greatest clarity and persuasiveness, the voice of
categorical claims may very well be our very own voice. And Gadamer
himself qualifies the alterity of the claim by saying, with reference to the
spectator, "It is the truth of his own world, the religious and moral world in
which he lives, which presents itself to him and in which he recognizes himself
(113, my italics). If the truth that claims me is simply the tradition that has
already shaped me, the spiritual world in and from which I live, and move,
and have my being, its voice is other but not so very damn other. If Gadamer
wants us to take seriously his appeal to Kierkegaard and to dialectical theology he must identify a claim that evokes fear and trembling not only from
me as an existing individual hut from my established order as well
(Kierkegaard, 1944: 89; Barth, 1968: 27-54). His lack of enthusiasm for such
a task is notorious.
For an unambiguous development of the clue we have found in Gadamer,
the idea that it is in the form of a claim upon us that we encounter the
otherness of the other, we can return to Levinas' account of metaphysical
desire as directed toward "something else entirely, toward the absolutely
other" (1969: 33). His analysis of enjoyment as involving self-centering
rather than self-transcendence is one of several foils against which he develops the thesis that "the absolutely other is the Other" (39).
Who is this Other? In the first instance it is the one whom I encounter face
to face in conversation (39, 71). In other words, the Other is another human
being. Because our encounter takes place in language, it can be no animal
other, and because it takes place face to face it can be no divine other. Rather,
"it is only man who could be absolutely foreign to me" (73; cf. 71-79).
Secondly, the Other is the one whose face and speech I first encounter,
beyond all knowing, all using, and all enjoying (38), as a claim, the unconditional constraint upon my freedom that leaves me fully free to accept or
reject it and that is expressed in the words, "You shall not commit murder"
(199,216,262,303). Only in the realm of ethics, only in "the ethical impossibility of killing [the Other]" (87), do I encounter otherness as truly other.
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This claim has a radically dec entering intent. "To welcome the Other is to
put in question my freedom" (85; cf. 51,43). It reminds me that I am not the
center to which all else is peripheral, the end to which all else is the means.
In the claims of the Other I am suddenly beyond all objects to be known, all
tools to be used, and all elements on which to feed either body or soul.
What is worse, from the perspective of the "dear self," the relation is
asymmetrical. It is not a prudent, contractual arrangement among equals in
which I offer to spare your life (and liberty) if you agree to spare mine. On
the one hand is the asymmetry of loftiness. The unconditional character of
the Other's claim can only be expressed in images of height and authority.
For this reason, although the Other is human and not divine, Levinas speaks
of the Other as "Most-High" (34) and "Master" (72, 75, 86). On the other
hand there is the asymmetry of indigence. This is why Levinas also refers to
the Other as the stranger, the widow, the orphan, and the poor (77-78). The
Other has nothing to offer in exchange for my welcoming, least of all a bribe.
With such indigent loftiness it is impossible to negotiate or to strike a deal.
Finally, the face of the Other "expresses itself," it manifests itself "kath'
auto" (51). We are familiar with this Greek phrase through its Latin equivalent, per se. The face of the other expresses itself, and it does so through
itself and not through another. This does not consist in its being disclosed,
"its being exposed to the gaze that would take it as a theme for interpretation,
and would command an absolute position dominating the object. Manifestation kath' auto consists in a being telling itself to us independently of every
position we would have taken in its regard, expressing itself' (65; cf. 67,74,
77).

The concept of disclosure that Levinas here contrasts with expression kath .
auto or 'revelation' has Husserlian-Heideggerian connotations. "To recognize
truth to be disclosure is to refer it to the horizon of him who discloses ... The
disclosed being is relative to us and not kath' auto" (64). By contrast, the
notion of the face as self-revelatory "brings us to a notion of meaning prior
to my Sinngebung and thus independent of my initiative and my power" (51).
Even more important, it is independent of the horizons of meaning we bring
with us, the tacit dimensions of our awareness that confer meaning without
our noticing it (28).
Levinas knows exactly what he is doing here. He is claiming immediacy
for the Other's self-expression. "The immediate is the face to face" (52). In
spite of all attacks on the "myth of the given," he is claiming that the face is
a theory free datum. In willful disregard for the alleged inescapability of the
hermeneutical circle, he finds us pointed toward "the possibility of signification without a context" (23). And in spite of all attacks on the metaphysics
of presence and the transcendental signifier (Derrida, 1976: 49-50, 69-71;
1981: 19-20, 29, 44), he insists that "the signification of the face is due to
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an essential coinciding of the existent and the signifier. Signification is not
added to the existent. To signify is not equivalent to presenting oneself as a
sign, but to expressing oneself, that is, presenting oneself in person" (262).
Such claims are bold heresy in the present philosophical climate. But in
spite of the avalanche of criticism they are bound to evoke, Levinas will want
to stick by them, for they are the key to his project. Without self-expression
kath' auto, I could not welcome the Other as such. The Other would be
permitted to encounter me only as a meaning relative to my own (present)
acts of Sinngebung or to the sedimented (past) acts of myself and of others
that I bring with me as horizon, context, pre-understanding, a priori, tacit
dimension, pre-judice. Since as thematizing and as operative intentionality I
would be the condition of the possibility of her appearance, she would clearly
be merely phenomenal. No per se, no an sich. Such an Other is not so very
damn other. But as the claim that challenges my centrality in its own terms
and not in my own, the Other is very other indeed.
This is not the immediacy that ends up as pure indeterminacy (Hegel, 1969:
82; cf. 1959: Par. 86). It is concerned with presence, to be sure, but not with
sheer presence beyond difference. It is Derrida, pursuing his own agenda of
difjirance, who points this out. By virtue of the lofty majesty attributed by
Levinas to the Other, the encounter with the Other "does not take the form
of an intuitive contact" since the Other is present "not as a total presence but
as a trace" (Derrida, 1978: 95). What we have here is "absolute proximity
and absolute distance ... A community of nonpresence, and therefore of nonphenomenality ... Only the other, the totally other, can be manifested ... within
a certain nonmanifestation and a certain absence ... 1t can be said only of the
other that its phenomenon is a certain non phenomenon, a certain absence"
(90-91, my italics).
This is why Levinas sometimes speaks of the Other simply as "the Stranger
who disturbs the being at home with oneself" (1969: 39). Without the additional appellations of widow, orphan, and poor, such a reference evokes
Camus rather than the Law and the Prophets and serves to make it clear that
the Other, when encountered as truly other, is an intangible intrusion and not
an intuitive intelligibility. It is for the same reason that Levinas emphasizes
the nudity of the face. This is not to deny that the face may be the bearer of
cultural codes, as when an expensive coiffure, a matted beard, or the unmistakable signs of Downs syndrome enable me to assign faces to their places
in the social hierarchy. It is simply to deny that the meaning and validity of
the Other's claim, "You shall not commit murder," is in any way dependent
on these cultural codes. The ethical immediacy of the Other as face has
nothing to do with pre-predicative indeterminacy; it is rather a matter of
expressing a claim unmediated by the cultural codes that normally censor all
claims.
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The face as the presence of the Other as absolutely other "is produced
concretely as a temptation to total negation, and as the infinite resistance to
murder .. .in the hard resistance of these eyes without protection-what is
softest and most uncovered" (262). If Camus' The Stranger renders uncomfortably concrete this "temptation to total negation," the death of the black
man, Christmas, in Faulkner's Light in August reveals "the infinite resistance
to murder .. .in ... these eyes without protection." A white lynch mob is determined to kill him, in spite of the testimony of the preacher, Hightower, that,
"He was here that night. He was with me the night of the murder, I swear to
God-" Grimm, their leader, finally corners Christmas, fires five shots into
him, and, as he lies dying, castrates him. The others catch up. "But the man
on the floor had not moved. He just lay there, with his eyes open and empty
of everything save consciousness ... For a long moment he looked up at them
with peaceful and unfathomable and unbearable eyes. Then his face, body,
all, seemed to collapse, to fall in upon itself, and from out of the slashed
gannents about his hips and loins the pent black blood seemed to rush like a
released breath ... upon that black blast the man seemed to rise soaring into
their memories forever and ever. They are not to lose it, in whatever peaceful
valleys, beside whatever placid and reassuring streams of old age, in the
mirroring faces of whatever children they will contemplate old disasters and
newer hopes. It will be there, musing, quiet, steadfast, not fading and not
parti<;ularly threatful, but of itself alone serene, of itself alone triumphant"
(1950: 406-407).

From out of the gaze of that black face the whole body of Christmas
becomes face, so much so that the black blood that gushes from between his
legs is transformed into a breath exuding from that face. According to the
cultural codes that are the horizon for white perceptions of that black face,
it is possible to interpret this killing, in spite of the victim's humanity, as
equivalent to slaughtering a hog, and simultaneously, in spite of the victim's
innocence, as a just punishment. If that were the whole story, it would be
possible to forget the deed. But those who were there cannot do so, because
the face of Christmas, against all the operative cultural codes, expresses
unambiguously and unforgettably a claim that they could reject but not refute,
"You shall not commit murder."
They can kill him, but they cannot reify him. They cannot reduce his
otherness to an object of their knowledge, a tool for their use, or nourishment
for their enjoyment. Helpless and humiliated, defeated and dying, he embodies a transcendence unlike any they have ever encountered in church. For the
gods they worship are idols, but Christmas is "wholly other."
Here we have the model we have been seeking to help us clarify the
Augustinian notion of self-transcendence. This is an Other whose transcendence consists in an unconditional claim that removes me from the center of
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the universe both ethically by constraining my will and epistemologically by
refusing to be constrained by the cultural codes of the world in which I
recognize myself.
This is the double dec entering that constitutes Augustine's double conversion in Books VII and VIII of the Confessions. That independence of
cultural codes precludes any account of knowledge as recollection is not
only the argument of Augustine's critique of Platonism in Book VII, but
also, and in greater detail, of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and Philosophical Fragments, taken jointly. Levinas reprises this argument by
sharply distinguishing the ethical, in which I encounter the Other as truly
other, from the political, in which I do not, and by repudiating recollection
repeatedly as the vehicle of the ethical (1969: 21-24, 43, 51, 61, 171, 180,
204). According to Derrida's apt summary, Levinas sees western philosophy as "dominated since Socrates by a Reason which receives only what
it gives itself, a Reason which does nothing but recall itself to itself." In
this way "it has always neutralized the other, in every sense of the word"
(Derrida, 1978: 96; cf. n. 27).
What here separates ethics from politics is what joins it to religion. Thus
Kierkegaard's tight linkage in the Postscript of ethics and religion as the
life-world of subjectivity, totally different from that of aesthetic-speculative
objectivity, finds its echo in Levinas's claim that true religion presupposes
ethics (77-78). We cannot truly love God while hating our sister and brother
(1 John 4:40). If Marcel and Merton are the great Catholic Augustinians of
our time, and Kierkegaard the great Protestant Augustinian, Levinas is the
great Jewish Augustinian.
The Other whose transcendence Levinas has helped us to specify provides
us with the opportunity for a unique self-transcendence. To welcome an Other
so unwelcome to the pride that the Augustinian tradition finds to be the heart
of our darkness and the darkness of our heart is to become a new person
indeed. We are, of course, still in the realm of ethics and not yet talking about
religious experience. For this Other is human and not divine. But all we have
to do is replace the human with the divine Other to have the normative
concept of religious experience we are looking for. Genuine religious experience is the self-transcendence in relation to a divine transcendence that
radically decenters us as will, and, correspondingly, as belief and affection.
Perhaps this link between the ethical and the religious is the truth behind
Kant's claims that "morality does not need religion at all," that "morality
leads inevitably to religion," and that "Religion is (subjectively regarded) the
recognition of all duties as divine commands" (1960: 3, 7n., 142).
It is now possible to specify just where a couple of earlier formulations
that looked so promising came up short. Gadamer's account of ecstatic selfforgetfulness in play, art, and religious ritual culminates in these words-
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"That which detaches him from everything also gives him back the whole of
his being" (1975: 113-14). These words evoked for us the claim of Jesus that
only those who lose their life will find it. But what Jesus says is this-"whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel's will save it" (Mark 8:35, my
italics).
Who is this Jesus, and what is this "gospel of Jesus Christ" (Mark 1: 1)7
Jesus is the one who has just responded to Peter's "You are the Messiah" with
the announcement, to be repeated on two subsequent occasions (9:30-32,
10:32-34, cf. 45), that far from being the Davidic warrior who has come to
slay the pharisaical-scribal Goliath of the Galilean synagogue, or the priestly
Goliath of the Jerusalem temple, or the imperial Goliath of Rome, he is the
Human One who must suffer arid die at the hands of these Goliaths. And the
good news about him centers in the call to a discipleship of self-denial and
joining him on the way of the cross (8:34). By leaving out the crucial words,
"for my sake and the gospel's," Gadamer leaves out precisely that decentering
of the self as will (to power, cf. 10:35-45) that distinguishes the Markan
account of self-transcendence as losing and finding oneself.
Similarly, we can now identify what C. S. Lewis failed to say when he
wrote, "Heaven offers nothing that a mercenary soul can desire. It is safe to
tell the pure in heart that they shall see God, for only the pure in heart want
to" (1962: 144-45). His glosses on this claim, you will recall, were in terms
of love as enjoyment of the object of desire. In order to get beyond the
self-referential character of enjoyment, we need to specify that the pure in
heart are precisely those who have learned to welcome Mark's Jesus as their
center. It is safe to tell them of the "pie in the sky" that consists in seeing
God not simply because they want to see God. For the God some want to see
is an idol, the cosmic legitimizer and guarantor of their own will to power
(Peter in Mark 8-"Get behind me, Satan," James and John in Mark 10, the
crowd on Palm Sunday). Rather, it is safe to tell them that they shall see God
because their purity of heart consists in willing the one thing they cannot will
from the centerHallowed be Thy name

Thy kingdom come
Thy will be done

The enjoyment of God known to such pure hearts is authentic self-transcendence, and the God enjoyed is genuinely transcendent. Transcendence is an
ethical category relating to the will, not an ontological category relating to
being.
A normative concept of religious experience defined in terms of welcoming
Mark's Jesus and learning to pray the prayer of his kingdom may seem too
specific, even sectarian, to define religious as distinct from Christian expe-
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rience. But the generic character of the concept is not compromised by the
concreteness of the tradition through which it has been introduced. It is, for
example, not difficult to show that the Brahman of the Hindu tradition and
the Nirvana of the Buddhist tradition are wholly other in the sense we
have now identified, for they confront me as an ethical claim that in both
its ascetic and altruistic dimensions defines the false self as the will to be
the center.
It would seem, then, that the concept of self-transcendence is useful
beyond the biblical framework used here to render it concrete. It focuses
attention on the ubiquitous challenge of religion to autonomous selfhood.
It is not the task of this essay to spell out in detail the differences and
similarities that emerge as the concept is employed across the spectrum of
religious phenomena.
Rather the question is whether this generic concept of genuine religious
self-transcendence takes us beyond the dangers of religious self-deception?
Will it no longer be necessary to ask Nietzsche's question, "What did I really
experience?"
Let us make the question even more concrete, returning to the tradition
we know best. Suppose I am Thomas a Kempis, and that I offer the following
prayer in all sincerity. "0 Lord, Thou knowest what is the better way, let this
or that be done, as Thou shalt please. Give what Thou wilt, and how much
Thou wilt, and when Thou wilt. Deal with me as Thou knowest, and as best
plea seth Thee, and is most for Thy honour. Set me where Thou wilt, and deal
with me in all things just as Thou wilt. I am in Thy hand: tum me round, and
tum me back again, even as a wheel. Behold, I am Thy servant, prepared for
all things; for I desire not to live unto myself, but unto Thee; and 0 that I
could do it worthily and perfectly" (1900: 127). Can we be confident that this
prayer is offered to a truly transcendent God, rather than an idol, and that the
prayer belongs to an experience of genuine self-transcendence?
Unfortunately not. We have already stipulated that these words are sincere.
We can further stipulate that their sincerity is attested by the appropriate
deeds. Our Thomas lives, let us say, an exemplary life of poverty, chastity,
and obedience. Still, we will be reminded, "However painstaking our work,
so long as we omit to surrender ourselves to God while performing it...our
efforts build up within us not so much a true spirit of grace but the spirit of
a Pharisee" (Chariton, 1966: 137). But how could such words and deeds fail
to express a dec entering surrender of oneself to God?
The answer is simple. Sincerity is no guarantee against self-deception.
Corresponding to the three idols whose transcendental deduction we noted
earlier are three modes of religious experience which do not even have the
form of true godliness, decentering self-transcendence. This piety, by contrast, has that form so conspicuously that it could be used as its paradigm.
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But that form may still be but appearance not supported by the reality it
professes. Our Thomas may unconsciously be a hypocrite.
To see how this is possible let us recall The Total Woman. Perhaps like me
you feel you have read this book even though you haven't. It suggests that
the way to happiness for a woman is to subordinate herself entirely to the
happiness of her lord and master. No, not God, but her husband. The combination of the theological claim that a radically hierarchical relation should
exist between husband and wife with an emphasis on the wife's responsibility
to keep the husband both sexually stimulated and satisfied, led Martin Marty
to summarize his review in four words: fundies in their undies. Some years
ago a student of mine wrote a review of this book which revealed the manipulative character of this conspicuous subordination. Again and again the book
said, in so many words, Treat your husband as your lord and master and he'll
be yours. You'll have no trouble keeping him for yourself or getting him to
do what you want. You'll be in control.
The life of the total woman has the form of decentering self-transcendence,
but not the substance. She may sincerely hold the beliefs and feel the emotions that her idea calls for, and she may perform a lifetime of sacrificial
service for her husband. But this does not keep her from being self-deceived
about what she has experienced, nor does it keep her devotion from being
manipulative. What appears to her as subordination and service is in fact a
complex web of strategic action in the service of her will to power. Secretly,
and she keeps this secret even from herself, she is the center of her world.
Exactly the same may be true of our saintly Thomas it Kempis. The form
of his piety is that of a decentering self-transcendence. Its inner content may
or may not correspond. The form is visible, to others and to him. The content
may be hidden from both. If it does not correspond and if he has managed
not to notice this, he is self-deceived and the god he serves, so far from being
genuinely transcendent, is not only constituted by his intentionality but also
constructed by his (hidden) intentions. Such a god, so far from being "wholly
other," is not so very damn other at all.
Given the multiple possibilities for self-deception, perhaps we can now
see why self-transcendence is the task of a lifetime and why genuine
transcendence is so elusive. And perhaps the current preoccupation with
alterity among some philosophers is more the expression of hunger than
of curiosity.
I want to suggest two conclusions for the philosophy of religion that seem
to me to follow from these reflections. If this essay were addressed primarily
to pastors or spiritual directors, I would address a very practical issue at this
point. While the foregoing has shown, I hope, the need for suspicion and
self-examination (since suspicion reduced to a tool for unmasking others
becomes thereby a tool for sustaining our own self-deceptions), it has not
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mentioned the dangers this entails, dangers of morbidity, masochism, and
cynicism. Since I do not want to draw too sharp a line between the pastoral
and the philosophical, the therapeutic and the theoretical, I pause at least long
enough to mention these issues.
But the two conclusions with which I want to conclude concern philosophy
as theory. It may seem as if our phenomenological reflections have ignored
one of the most intensely debated philosophical questions relating to religious experience, namely whether it can provide good reasons to support
religious beliefs. But this is not so. Instead, the account of religious experience we have developed together would seem to place a major obstacle in
the way of any positive answer to this question we might seek to develop.
Our normative concept suggests that the intentional object of religious experience that lacks either the form or the substance of true godliness will be
an idol of one sort or another. Such experience can hardly provide rational
support for beliefs that purport to express the genuine transcendence of the
truly divine. For religious experience to have any evidential value, it will
first have to be shown to be authentic.
There are perhaps two reasons why this task has been conspicuously absent
from most discussions. One is its obvious difficulty. The other is the principle
of charity, the tendency to consider religious experience innocent until proven
guilty. But neither of these is a good reason. An essential task becomes less
essential because of its difficulty only in the presence of self-deceptive laziness. And no matter how wonderfully American it may sound, the innocentuntil-proven-guilty principle simply ignores 1) the biblical claim that "the
heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately corrupt" (Jer. 17:9), 2) the
powerful theoretical analyses, only briefly developed in this essay, of selfdeception whenever self-transcendence is at issue, and 3) our own "thou art
the man" experience in the presence of such analyses.
One way to put this point would be to say that religious experience cannot
provide any evidence for truth as objectivity until it has passed the test of
truth as subjectivity. This link between the hermeneutics of suspicion and
questions of inwardness and authenticity leads to a second conclusion. It puts
in question the wisdom of doing business as usual within the religious epistemology industry. No doubt reflection is and ought to be ancilLa vitae. But
when the philosophy of religion, on this issue or any other, so focuses on
objectivity as to let issues of subjectivity get forgotten or rendered peripheral,
it shows itself to be ancillary to the life of some objectivist culture, Hegelian,
positivist, technocratic, or whatever, that is systematically prejudiced against
religious experience in general and the life of Christian faith in particular.
This fact, if it is indeed a fact, is deserving of more attention than it usually
gets among Christians in philosophy.
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*This essay is derived from two lectures given at the annual Wheaton College Philosophy Conference in October of 1989.
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